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The sharp increase in bank failures in the United States since 1980 has focused atten-
tion on the causes ofbanking instability and the appropriate role of government policy.1 To
gain insight into recent experience with bank failures, researchers have begun to draw on
evidence from previous episodes when failures were similarly high. The sharp increase in
bank failures during the 1920s resembles the more recent experience of the 1980s; in both
decades, branching restrictions left banks vulnerable to localized distress, and failures were
confined mainly to regions suffering depressed commodity and real estate prices. Banks in
other regions were largely spared in both episodes.2
Laws restricting branching and other forms ofdiversification are onegovernment policy
that exacerbated bank failures in both the 1920s and 1980s. Deposit insurance is a second
policy that has been linked to banking instability in both decades.3 Deposit insurance
removes the incentive for depositors to monitor bank risk, and thereby encourages banks
to substitute deposits for equity and to maintain greater portfolio risk than they otherwise
would. Although there was no federal insurance of bank deposits until 1934, several states
experimented with insurance during the 19th and early 20th centuries, including eight
states that enacted insurance systems between 1907 and 1920 for their state-chartered
banks.4 Calomiris (1992) shows that during the agricultural boom associated with World
War I, insured banks grew more rapidly than their uninsured competitors and banks in
states without insurance systems. Insured banks then suffered the greatest asset declines
and had the highest failure rates after the collapse of commodity prices in mid-1920.
Aiston, Grove and Wheelock (1993) show that bank failure rates were highest in states
with deposit insurance systems, after controlling for branch banking, other government
policies, and differences in economic activity across states.5
—1---Since the causes of banking instability during the 1920s and 1980s were similar, mi-
croeconomic analysis of bank behavior during the 1920s might provide useful insights for
the recent experience. In this paper, we use information about asample ofbanks operating
in Kansas during the period 1910—1928 to examine the causes of bank failure. Roughly
one-quarter of Kansas state-chartered banks either failed or merged with other banks dur-
ing this period. These historical data offer two important advantages over contemporary
data. First, the voluntary deposit insurance system existing in Kansas during this period
permits comparison of insured and uninsured banks facing otherwise similar regulatory
and economic conditions. Second, the, data allow construction of a longitudinal data set
covering a longer period than is typically possible with contemporary data.
We model time-to-failure explicitly using a proportional hazards framework. We use
balance sheet information, deposit insurance system membership status, and measures of
technical efficiency to explain failure and survival of individual banks. Although other
studies have investigated the relationship between technical efficiency and bank failures,
they have typically done so by comparing mean measured efficiency scores among failed and
surviving banks (e.g., see Berger and flumphrey, 1992 and Barr ‘et al., 1992). Thus, ‘these
studies fail to control for other factors such as risk or competition, and do not explicitly
model time-to-failure. We find that both insurance system membership and efficiency
provide useful informaton about failure not captured by conventional financial ratios. Our
findings indicate that inefficiently operated banks were more likely to fail, as were insured
banks. The results suggest that measures of technical efficiency could prove useful for
predicting bank failures in other settings.2. BANKING IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
Whereas bank failures in the 1980s are closely associated with the boom and subse-
quent bust in real estate markets, bank failures in the 1920s are closely associated with
the fortunes of agriculture. American agriculture expanded rapidly during World War I
and in the immediate postwar months. Between 1910 and 1920, the total value of farm
property nearly doubled, as did farm output prices.6 Accompanying the increase in farm
acreage and value was a 132% increase in farm mortgage debt, much of which was supplied
by commercial banks.7 The number of commercial banks in the United States rose during
the decade from 25,151 in 1910 to 30,909 in 1920.8 After peaking in mid-1920, farm output
prices plunged. An index of farm output prices that equaled 150.7 in 1920 fell to 88.4 by
1921 (1926=100).~Farm income collapsed, and many farmers were unable to repay debt
incurred before 1920. Banks in agricultural regions experienced sharp increases in loan
defaults and many became insolvent.’0
In Kansas, 122 state-chartered banks failed between September 1920 and September
1926.11 Of those, 94 were members of the state deposit insurance system when they failed,
while 28 were not, and the failure rate ofinsured banks (4.6%) was twice that of uninsured
state banks (2.3%). By contrast, just six national banks (0.8%) failed during this period.
The Kansas deposit guaranty system was begun in 1909, and membership was made
optional in response to complaints that deposit insurance penalizes conservative banks
by forcing them to protect depositors of banks that are more likely to fail. Only state-
chartered banks that had operated for at least one year were permitted to join.’2 Insured
banks were required to maintain minimum ratios of capital to deposits and of surplus
and undistributed profits to capital of .iO.’~Banks were permitted to withdraw from the
system with six months notice, but remained subject to levies needed to pay depositors of
—3—banks that failed while the bank carried deposit insurance.
Some attempt was made to discourage risk-taking by setting insurance premiums at
1/20th of 1% of a bank’s insured deposits less capital. The low assessment rate meant,
however, that relative to the cost of capital, the incentive to hold additional capital was
small.’4 Insuredbankswererequired to deposit $500 ofcashor eligible bondswith thestate
banking commissioner for each $100,000 of insured deposits as a guarantee of assessment
payment.
Despite regulations implemented to discourage risk-taking and a reputation for rela-
tively strict supervision, the comparatively high failure rate of insured banks in Kansas
suggests that excess risk-taking was not prevented entirely. Wheelock and Kumbhakar
(1993) show that during its first ten years, the Kansas system attracted the most risk-
prone banks, and that once insured, banks tended to reduce their capital/asset ratios.
The evidence indicates, therefore, that the system suffered from both adverse selection
and moral hazard problems. Not surprisingly, insured banks had the highest failure rates
when farm prices collapsed and loan losses rose.
Wheelock (1992) estimates a probit model to identify the characteristics of Kansas
banks that failed between 1920 and 1926. Using financial ratios suggested by White
(1984), Wheelock finds that a bank was more likely to fail the lower was its surplus/loan,
bond/asset, reserve/deposit, or deposit/asset ratio.15 A bank was also more likely to fail,
the higher was its loan/asset or short-term borrowed funds/asset ratio.
Wheelock (1992) also investigates the role of deposit insurance. He includes deposit
insurance membership (measuredwith a dummy variable equal to 1 for insured banks and
to 0 for uninsured banks) as a regressor. Mis-priced deposit insurance encourages banks to
hold riskier assets and less capital than they otherwise would. Although data on financial
—4—ratios are available for Kansas banks, the quality of their assets is unknown. Thus, includ-
ing deposit insurance as a regressor tests whether insurance increased the probability of
failure, presumably by encouraging riskier investments, apart from its possible influence on
the capital ratios. Wheelock finds that deposit insurance membership is a useful predictor
of bank failure, especially the closer a bank was to failure.
This paper builds on Wheelock (1992) in two ways. First, weexplicitly model the haz-
ard distribution with time-varying covariates obtained from panel data.’6 Second, wedraw
on a growing literature that attempts to measure the technical efficiency of banks. Several
recent studies have investigated technical efficiency in the banking industry; e.g., Sherman
and Gold (1985), Rangan et a!. (1988), Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Aly et a!. (1990), Fixier
and Zieschang (1992), Fried et a!. (1993), and others. In measuring technical efficiency,
one attempts to answer questions such as how much more output can be produced from
the same inputs, or how much less input can be used to produce the same output. Our
empirical results suggest that measures of technical efficiency are useful for explaining the
probability of failure in our data.
The remainder of the paper is divided as follows. The next section discusses the
methodology underlying the measurement of technical efficiency; the fourth section de-
scribes the data used to measure efficiency and presents the results of this measurement.
The fifth section discusses the hazard model used to investigate bank failures and presents
estimation results.
3. EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT
To measure Technical efficiency among banks in this study we use a linear program-
ming (LP) framework to construct production set boundaries that allow measurement of
the relative efficiency of banks in the sample. The LP framework easily allows treatment
—5—of multiple inputs and outputs, and avoids the need to specify functional forms for tech-
nology and error processes. In the standard approach to measuring technical efficiency,
which involves the estimation of parametric production functions, these issues are often
problematic. For example, one can account for multiple outputs and multiple inputs by
estimating cost functions (e.g., Conrad and Strauss, 1983), but examination of other types
of efficiency using a stochastic parametric framework may be difficult or impossible in this
case. With regard to the specification of the production process, one can hypothesize an
underlying production function, but in some applications such as banking the production
process is not easily specified. Similarly, one can arbitrarily impose distributional assump-
tions so as to satisfy regularity conditions in the resulting likelihood function and to ease
the actual estimation, but this can have a potentially large impact on both the magni-
tude and ordering of the estimated efficiency scores. The method we employ easily allows
for multiple outputs, requires minimal assumptions about the underlying functional form
of the production process, and requires no assumptions on underlying distributions; no a
priori specification of an error process is necessary. These characteristics are especially rel-
evant to the study of technical efficiency in settings such as banking where the underlying
production process may be ill-defined.
Although there were a few early attempts at nonparametric efficiency measurement
(e.g., Boles, 1966), work by Charnes et at. (1978, 1979) and Fare et al. (1985) gave rise
to a large and growing literature that has been termed Data Envelopment Analysis. Fare
et a!. (1985) describe several measures of efficiency that may be computed by simple LP
methods which fit piece-wise linear convex boundaries to the production set; efficiency is
measured by the distance of each decision-making unit (DMU) from the production set
boundary. These efficiency measures have been employed in banking studies by Sherman
—6—and Gold (1985), Rangan et at. (1988), Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Aly et al. (1990), Parkan
(1987), Berg et al. (1993a, 1993b), and Vassiloglou and Giokas (1990) among others, and
in other applications as discussed by Lovell (1993).
Given the discussion in the preceeding section, we use the weak output technical
efficiency (WOE) measure discussed by Fare et al. (1985). This measure is consistent with
the Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957) notions of technical efficiency. The WOE measure
may be computed by solving the LP problem
max{8k~Xqk~~ Oyk,Cqk = l,q,~E ~J~} (1)
where n DMUs produce s outputs using rn inputs, qj~is a (n x 1) vector of weights to be
computed for the kth DMU,
9
k 1 is a scalar, Xk is a (m x 1) vector of inputs for the
kth DMU, Yk is a (s x 1) vector of outputs for the kth DMU, X = [x,,...,x,~}is a (m x n)
matrix of observed inputs, Y [y,, ..., y,~] is a (s x n) matrix of observed outputs, and C
is a (1 x n) vector of ones.
The maximand
0
k in (1) measures the WOE of the kth DMU, with values strictly
greater than unity indicating the presence of technical inefficiency. The inequality con-
straints in (1) define a reference technology with strong disposability of outputs. For the
kth DMU, Ok gives the proportion by which outputs can be increased to move the DMU
from the interior of the production set onto the piecewise-linear boundary of the production
set corresponding to the reference technology in (1), holding inputs fixed. This is illus-
trated in Figure la for the case of two output quantities y,, y2 produced from a constant
input quantity x,. A, B, C, and D represent DMUs; A and B lie on the piecewise-linear
boundary of the convex production set, while C and D lie within the interior of the pro-
duction set. DMUs such as C and D may lie in the interior of the production set due
to imperfect information, managerial incompetence, or perhaps other reasons. For DMU
—7—C, the WOE measure in (1) is given by the ratio of distances OC’/OC in Figure la. By
proportionately increasing the output quantities produced by DMU C by OC’/ OC, the
DMU moves to point C’ and would be considered efficient in the WOE sense.
The assumption of strong disposability ofoutputs leads to portions of the production-
set boundary that are parallel to the axes in Figure la. Dropping the assumption of strong
disposability of inputs leads to a congestion problem in the production process considered
by Fare and Grosskopf (1983). Such a technology is likely to be relevant for agriculture
and highways, but seems unlikely to be relevant in the present application. However, for
DMUs such as D in Figure la, the optimal solution in (1) giving the WOE score will
result in slack in the output constraints. This slack is another source of inefficiency not
captured by the WOE measure, and is examined further in the empirical section below.
Given a sample of n DMUs, solving (1) for a DMU such as D in Figure la will result in an
efficient subset of DMUs located on the boundary of the production set; all observations
lying outside the cone spanned by this efficient subset (shown by the shaded area in Figure
la) will have slack in their output constraints (see Lovell, 1993).
Constraining the weights in ~ in (1) to sum to unity allows the reference technology to
exhibit variable returns to scale. Alternatively, constraining Cqk ~ 1 results in a reference
technology with nonincreasing returns to scale, while omitting the constraint results in
a technology with constant returns to scale. Letting 0, 0NIRS, and 6CRS denote the
WOE measures computed while imposing variable, nonincreasing, and constant returns to
scale, respectively, scale efficiency may be examined by checking for each DMU whether
O = 0CRS~If 0 = 0CRS, then the DMU is scale-efficient; otherwise, it is located along the
decreasing returns portion of the technology if 0 = 0NIRS, or along the increasing returns
portion of the technology if 0 ~E0NIRS~
—8—Finally, note that WOE is a radial measures ofefficiency; i.e., efficiency for a DMU is
measured along a ray emanating from the origin and passing through the DMU in input-
output space. Consequently, the efficiency scores calculated from (1) are independent
of the units of measurement used for both inputs and outputs. This is important since
units of measurement may always be defined arbitrarily. Lovell (1993) observes that some
efficiency measurement formulations do not share this property.
Although the paradigm where firms take inputs as given and attempt to maximize
outputs seems to best reflect the situation faced by managers of banks in our sample, it
is also possible to measure technical inefficiency while assuming inputs may ,be adjusted
subject to fixed outputs. Ifwe assume strong disposability of inputs, this gives rise to the
input weak efficiency (IWE) measure suggested by Fare et at. (1985). The IWE measure
is computed by solving the LP problem
min{Ak~Xqk ~ ~ = i,q~ ~ (2)
with variables defined as in (1) above. The minimand )‘k measures IWE for the kth DMU.
Clearly, 0 < Ak <1, with Ak = 1 denoting no technical inefficiency.
The IWE measure is illustrated in Figure lb, where DMUs A, B, and C produce the
same output level from input quantities x1, x2. DMUs A and B lie on the piecewise-linear
boundary of the production set, and are thus regarded as efficient, while DMUs C and D
lie in the interior of the production set and are regarded as inefficient. The IWE score for
DMU C is given by OC’/OC, and indicates the amount by which DMU C’s input levels
may be proportionately reduced to reach the production set boundary. DMUs such as D
which lie outside the cone spanned by the efficient subset containing A and B (indicated
by the shaded area) yield slack in the input constraints when (2) is solved; as before, this
slack represents an additional source of inefficiency. Note that the IWE score is also a
—9—radial efficiency measure, and thus is independent of units of measurement.
4. RESULTS OF EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT
The data used in this study consist of a panel of Kansas banks for which we collected
balancesheet and other information as ofAugust 31 ofeach even numberedyearfrom 1910
to 1926 (except 1912 and 1916, when this information was not published).’7 The sample
includes 259 banks (approximately one-fourth the total operating in 1914).18 Of these, 47
had failed by September 1, 1928.
As noted by Aly et al. (1990), there is considerable disagreement in the literature on
thedefinitionofinputs andoutputs for banks. Berger et at, (1987) and Clark (1989) discuss
two alternative approacheswhere banks are viewed as either financial intermediaries or as
production units. Following Aly et at. and Grabowski et a!. (1993), we use the interme-
diation approach and define four inputs: capital (X,), long-term funds (X2), short-term
funds(X3), and labor(X4). Capital is measured by the book value of building, furni-
ture, and fixtures. Long-term funds are measured by time and demand certificates, while
short-termfunds are measured by bills payable, bills rediscounted, and other liabilities’not
enumerated. Labor is proxied by the number of officers in the bank. No information is
available on the actual number ofemployees in each bank, and hence we must assume that
the number of officers was proportional to the total number of employees. Since most of
the banks in the sample were quite small, this does not seem an unreasonable assumption.
Two outputs are defined, namely total loans (Y,) and individual deposits (Y2). For some
years covered by the data,loans listed on balance sheets were divided into realestate loans
and other loans, but in other years the two types were combined. To maintain consistency
throughout the dataset, total loans are used as an output for each period. The individual
deposits output corresponds to the use of demand deposits as an output by Aly et at.
— 10 —The LP model in (1) must be solved once for each observation in the sample. For
each bank in each year, efficiency was computed relative to all banks in the given year.
Summary statistics on the results of this exercise are shown in Table 1. Both mean and
median efficiency fluctuate over the 16-yearperiod. Median efficiency is included in Table
1 becausethe distribution ofscores computed from (1) are typically skewed; in such cases
the median statistic provides a more robust measure of location than the mean statistic.
By comparing the mean and median values, it is clear that the WOE scores are skewed
away from unity in each year. Mean inefficiency increases eachyear from 1910—1924, then
sharply declines in 1926.
Table 2 shows mean WOE scores for survivors and failures over six time periods.
Failed banks are those reportedas failed by thebank commissioner; banks that underwent
merger, voluntary liquidation, or that changed their charter from the state are regarded
as censored. In Table 2, survivors are those banks that operated throughout the period,
while failures are those that failed during the indicated period (totals do not add up to
the numbers of observations in Table 1 due to censoring ofobservations). Mean efficiency
scores are based on banks’ performance at the beginning of each period. For the first
three periods shown in Table 2, mean efficiency scores forfailing banks are less than mean
efficiency scores for surviving banks; however, the number offailures in each period is very
low. For the last three periods, when the number of failures was larger, mean efficiency
scores arehigher for failing banks than for surviving banks. This result is consistent with
results obtained by Barr et at. (1992) and Berger and Humphrey (1992) for the 1980s
suggesting that failing banks are less efficient than non-failing banks.
As noted earlier, slacks in the output constraints in (1) represent an additional source
of inefficiency. For each bank, slack in each output was computed as a percentage of
— 11 —the corresponding output by the individual bank; mean values of these percentages are
reported for each period for surviving and failing banks in Table 3. Also, mean values for
total slack as a percentage of total output for each bank are reported. As in Table 2, the
last three rows of Table 3 are of particular interest since most failures occurred during these
periods. Failed banks have little or no slack in the loan output (Y,). Survivors have some
slack in this output for the last three periods, and a great deal of slack in the 1918—1920
and 1920—1922 periods. Slack in the individual deposits output (Y2) for failed banks is
greater than the mean percentages for survivors in all but the first period shown in Table
3. Furthermore, total slack as a percentage of total output is larger for failed banks than
for survivors in all but the first and third periods. These results are consistent with the
results for the WOE score; failed banks appear to be less efficient than survivors.
To examine scale efficiency, define
I aIaCRS 1~ a ~ aNIRS
(~P~AT7~’ )“I’~ ~
L.FW1~J1~I — CRS ~ 1 — 0/0 otherwise.
Then SCALE measures scale inefficiency, with SCALE = 0 indicating that a bank is
operating at the point of constant returns to scale, and SCALE greater (less) than zero
indicating that the bank is operating under the increasing (decreasing) returns portion
of the technology. Mean values for SCALE, along with the numbers of banks under the
increasing, constant, and decreasing returns portions of the production technology are
shown in Table 4 for survivors and failures. Although there is considerable fluctuation in
the number of banks operating under the decreasing and increasing returns portions of the
production technology, no obvious patterns emerge.
— 12 —5. EXPLICIT MODELING OF BANK FAILURES
We use the proportional hazards model developed by Cox (1972) to model time-to-
failure for banks. The proportional hazards model assumes the hazard relationship
0(tlz) = Oo(t)e~ (4)
where z is a row vector of measured covariates and j3 is a column vector of parameters
with the appropriate dimensions. The hazard 0(tlz) gives the instantaneous rate of failure
per unit time period at time t. This model assumes a baseline hazard, 0o(t), which is
identical for all banks in the sample; the covariates in z influence the overall hazard for
each bank through the exponential term in (4) (the choice of an exponential form here
is common throughout the literature on hazard estimation and simplifies the estimation
problem relative to choices of other functional forms). The model is semiparametric since
the exponential in (4) is a parametric form, while the baseline hazard involves an un-
specified form and hence is nonparametric. Consequently, the model is more flexible than
models where the failure time distribution is assumed known except perhaps for a few
scalar parameters.
Given the hazard specification in (4), the corresponding survivor function (which gives
the probability of survival up to time t) may be written as
S(tjz) = exp[~ j Oo(u)e~du], (5)
and the density function is then f(tIz) = 0(tlz)S(tIz). For uncensored observations with
failure at time T, the contribution to the likelihood is f(TIz); for observations censored at
time T, the contribution to the likelihood is S(TIz), i.e., the probability of survival until
time T.
For the data used in this study, each bank i in the sample is observed at J~ different
times t~< t~2< ... < ~ with either failure or censoring occurring at time ~ Note
— 13 —that times here refer not to calendar time, but to time relative to the date of charter for
bank i so that t~o = 0 where t20 is the date of charter for the ith bank. The balance sheet
information and efficiency scores used inz corresponding to time t23, j = 1,.. .,(J2 —1), are
assumed to reflect thepositionofbank i over theinterval ~ tI(j+,)). The model estimated
in this paper is time-varying in the sense that covariates in z are assumed constant for
intervals oftime [t23, t~(j+,)),but mayvary acrossdifferent intervals. Thus for the ith bank
there are (.J~ —1) censored observations where the contribution to the likelihood is given by
[S(t~(j+,)Iz) — S(t2iIz)]; again, the J2th observation represents either failure or censoring.
As discussed in the previous section, balance sheet data for the banks in our sample
were reported as of August 31 for even-numbered years (except 1912 and 1916). In ad-
dition, the charter date of each bank and the failure date for banks that failed prior to
August 31, 1928 are known. Several banks in the sample either merged with other banks
during the period ofthe study or adopted a national charter; in these cases the data are
considered censored at the date of merger or change in charter. Data on banks which did
not voluntarilyliquidate, merge, fail, or change their charter prior to August 31, 1928 were
recorded as censored at that date.
To distinguish between failing and non-failing banks, we include measured efficiency
and slack, various financial ratios, and deposit insurance system membership status as
independent variables in the hazard model. In addition, we include dummy variables cor-
responding to the last four periods listed in Tables 2—4 (PER4, PER5, PER6, and PER7,
respectively) to capture any systematic determinants of failure not otherwise accounted
for by the model.
From the analysis of technical efficiency, we include WOE, the efficiency score com-
puted from (1), and SLACK, which is defined as total output slack as a percentage of
- 14 —total output quantities. No units of measurement problems arise here since both outputs
are measured in dollars. If increasing inefficiency raises the probability of bank failure, as
might be expected, then the coefficients on each variable should be positive.
As additional independent variables, we include CAPRAT, which is the ratio of the
book value of equity to total assets;’9 BNDRAT, the ratio of a bank’s bond holdings to
total assets; LOANRT, the ratio of total loans to total assets; CSHDEP, the ratio of
cash items, currency, coin, and exchange to total deposits; DEPRAT, the ratio of total
deposits to toal assets; and LIABRT, the ratio ofbills payable and miscellaneous liabilities
to total assets. The probability of failure is expected to be higher for lower values of
CAPRAT, BNDRAT, CSHDEP, and DEPRAT. The first captures a bank’s ability to
absorb loan losseswhile remainingsolvent. Since the specific bonds that Kansasbanks held
is unknown, the sign of the coefficient on BNDRAT could be either positive or negative.
However, U.S. Government bonds probably comprised the largest share of most banks’
bond portfolios, especially after U.S. entry into World War I, and hence we expect the
coefficient will be negative.20 Banks with a low ratio ofcash and other reserves to deposits
were relatively less well protected against suddent deposit withdrawals, and hence had a
higherprobability of closurefrom illiquidity. The coefficient on CSHDEP is thus expected
to be negative.
Since deposits tend to be a relatively low-cost source of funds, conservative banks
would likely have been able to attract sufficient deposits to meet their need for funds.
Banks that were less conservative, on the other hand, may have had to rely more on high-
cost sources, such as bills payable. Hence the coefficient on DEPRAT should be negative,
and that on LIABRT is expected to be positive. The coefficient on LOANRT is also
expected to be positive since loans typically are riskier than other bank investments.2’
- 15 -Wheelock (1992) found that in 1920 the balance sheets of Kansas commercial banks
with deposit insurance differed markedly from those of uninsured banks. Forexample, as
predicted by models of bank behavior with insurance (e.g., Merton, 1977), insured banks
maintained lower capital/asset ratios than uninsured banks. These models also predict
that insured banks will hold riskier assets, and since we do not have information about
the riskiness of bank portfolios, we include an indicator variable of whether or not a bank
had deposit insurance as an additional regressor. The variable INS equals 1 if a bank was
a member of the state deposit insurance system, and 0 otherwise.
The high number ofbank failures in Kansas that followed the collapse of commodity
prices in 1920 put a severe strain on the state deposit insurance system. The failure ofthe
state’s largest insured bank, the American State Bank of Wichita, in early 1923, marked
the beginning of a decline in deposit insurance system membership. Although the bank’s
depositors were eventually madewhole, itwas generally recognizedthat the insurancefund
would go bankrupt without higher insurance premiums anda marked decline in failures.22
Although premiums were increased to their legal maximum, the number of failures did
not decline, and in March 1925 the state bank commissioner suspended the payment of
insurance claims. In April 1926, the state supreme court ruled that banks could leave the
system without liability for future claims by simplyforfeiting thebonds they had deposited
to guarantee payment of insurance assessments. Membership then declined rapidly. In
December 1925, 62% of eligible banks belonged to the insurance system. By December
1926, membership was down to 42%, and by December 1927, just 9% of eligible banks
remained insured (FDIC, 1956, p. 68).
Although the supreme court ruling in 1926 effectively ended the insurance of bank
deposits in Kansas, depositors may have doubted the credibility of insurance much earlier,
- 16 -especially after the payment of claims was suspended in early 1925. If depositors lost faith
in the system, they should have begun to monitor their banks, demand risk premiums
on deposit interest rates and withdraw their funds from banks taking unacceptable risks.
In other words, if depositors did not believe an insurance payoff was likely in the event
of failure, they should have demanded the same terms from an insured bank as from
a uninsured bank. Hence the ability (and incentive) for insured banks to take greater
risks than uninsured banks would have disappeared. By 1925, therefore, the relationship
between insurance system membership and the probability offailure might have changed.
To test for this possibility, we include two addtional variables: INSBEF equals INS prior
to September 1, 1924, and 0 otherwise; INSAFT equals INS for September 1, 1924 and
thereafter, and 0 otherwise.
As a final independent variable, we include LIAB, the sum of all bank liabilities and
equity (thus equal to total assets), to capture possible economies of scale. If larger banks
were less likely to fail, the coefficient on LIAB should be negative.
The proportional hazard model described above was estimated using using the partial
likelihood method described by Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980, pp. 70—142). Results of
the estimation of the parameters in /3 are reported in Table 5. Since the covariates in
the hazard model are time-varying, estimates of the baseline hazard are difficult to obtain
and are inconsistent; furthermore, since the baseline hazard has ambiguous meaning when
time-varying covariates are used, it is not reported here.
Table 5 contains the estimation results from five specifications of the hazard model.
Model I contains both the WOE and SLACK variables; t-ratios indicate that SLACK is
significant at .05 while WOE is insignificantly different from zero. To allow for possible
effects caused by multicollinearity among the covariates, the model was reestimated while
- 17 -first deleting SLACK and then deleting WOE; these models are labelled IIand III, respec-
tively. When SLACK is deleted in model II, the coefficient on WOE increases relative to
the value in model land becomes significant at .01. Computing the likelihood-ratio statis-
tic 2(LLFresiric~d— LLF1ree) for models II and III produces values 3.022 and 0.042,
respectively, which are each distributed chi-square with one degree of freedom. Thus, the
restriction in model IIis significant at .10, while the restriction in model IIIis insignificant.
These results suggest that SLACK is important for explaining bank failure. However, when
both SLACK and WOE are deleted as in model IV, the log-likelihood declines (relative to
model 1) to —134.104, yielding a likelihood-ratio statistic of6.102, which with two degrees
of freedom is significant at .05. Hence WOE is also important in explaining bank failure,
although estimation of the precise effect of WOE is difficult due to rather strong correla-
tion between WOEand SLACK (the Pearson correlation coefficient for these variables is
0.5882). The positive signs on both variables indicate that increasing inefficiency raises
the probability of failure.
In models I—IV, INSBEFis significant at .05, while INSAFT is insignificant. Further-
more, the positive sign on INSBEF indicates that prior to 1924 insured banks were more
likely to fail than uninsured banks; the results indicate that insurance played an insignifi-
cant role in determining bank failure after 1924. In model V, INSBEF and INSAFT were
replaced by INS, which amounts to restricting the coefficients on INSBEF and INSAFT to
be equal. Comparing model V with model I, the likelihood-ratio statistic is 7.158, which,
with one degree of freedom, is significant at .01. Thus the null hypothesis that insurance
played the same role before and after 1924 is soundly rejected.23
Among the financial ratios, the coefficients on CAPRAT and CSHDEP have the ex-
pected signs and are significant at the .05 level across the five specifications. The lower
— 18 —a bank’s capital/assets or cash/deposits ratios, the more likely it was to fail. LIABRT is
significant at the .10 level, except in Equation IV. As expected, the higher this ratio, the
more likely a bank ‘was to fail. BNDRAT and LOANRT are significant only in Equation
IV, however, and the sign on LOANRT is opposite what was expected, which is likely due
to multicollinearity among the various financial ratios.24 Finally, the coefficient on LIAB
is not statistically significant, suggesting that after controlling for the various financial
ratios, technical efficiency and deposit insurance, failure was not a function of size.
The time dummy variables PER5, PER6, and PER7 are significant at .05 or higher
in each specification shown in Table 5. PER4 is insignificant in all cases. The positive
signs indicate that banks were more likely to fail in these periods, holding other factors
constant, perhaps due to overall business conditions.
Werepeated the hazard model estimation using the IWE efficiency score and informa-
tion about input slack obtained from (2). The results were qualitatively similar, although’
the coefficient on the IWE score was not significantly different from zero at the .10 confi-
dence level in any specification.
6. CONCLUSIONS
As in the 1980s, during the 1920s a collapse of commodity and real estate prices
precipitated a high number of bank failures. Though hundreds of banks failed, many
more survived. What characteristic distinguish the failures from the survivors? As other
researchers have found using both historical and modern data, our results indicate that
in Kansas weakly capitalized banks, those holding few reserves, and those relying heavily
on short-term borrowed funds ex ante, had a higher probability of failure than their more
conservatively managed competitors. We also found that members of the state deposit
insurance system had a higher probability of failure than non-members, consistent with
- 19 -the hypothesis that insurance encourages banks to hold higher-risk portfolios than they
otherwise would.
Finally, we found that the more adept a bank was at transforming inputs — savings
deposits, borrowed funds, labor and capital — into loans and demand deposits, the better
its chance ofsurviving Kansas’ economic downturn. In the empirical model of bank failures,
measures ofoutput efficiency and slack contributed significant explanatory power, and did
not simply mimic the effects of deposit insurance and management behavior captured by
various financial ratios. Whether measures of technical efficiency will prove useful for
explaining bank failures generally awaits its application to other data sets. Our findings
suggest, however, that efficiency may well be an important determinant of which banks
fail and which survive during periods of significant economic distress.
-- 20 —NOTES
1. See, for example, Mishkin (1992) and Kane (1989).
2. This is in contrast to the Great Depression, when failures were widespread. Even
then, however, failure rates were highest among small, unit banks in rural areas.
White (1983) and Alston, Grove and Wheelock (1993) trace the banking instability of
the 1920s to branch banking restrictions. O’Driscoll (1988, 1991) makes the case for
the 1980s.
3. For the 1980s, see O’Driscoll (1988), Kane (1989), Mishkin (1992), and the references
therein. Robert Forrestal, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, argued
that branching restrictions and deposit insurance were responsible for many of the
problems in the modern banking system in a speech delivered in Atlanta September
25, 1992 at the Conference on Efficiency in the Financial Services Industries.
4. The eight states and the years in which their insurance systems operated are Ok-
lahoma (1907-23), Texas (1909-25), Kansas (1909-29), Nebraska (1909-30), South
Dakota (1909-31), North Dakota (1917-29), Washington (1917-29), and Mississippi
(1914-30). Cooke (1909), Robb (1921), American Bankers Association (1933), Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation (1956), and Calomiris (1989) compare thefeatures
and performance of the systems.
5. See also Thies and Gerlowski (1989).
6. An index of farm product prices equaled 74.3 in 1910 and 150.7 in 1920 (1926=100)
[Historical Statistics of the United States (1960, series E15)].
7. Moreover, the ratio of farm debt to value rose from 27.3% to 29.1% [Abstract of the
1~thCensus of the United States (1920, p. 737)].
8. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1959), At! Bank Statistics, 1896-
1955. The number of banks reached its all-time recordof 31,076 in 1921.
9. Historicat Statistics of the United States (1960, series E15).
10. The north central states of Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Nebraska and Kansas accounted for 2652 of the 5712 bank suspensions in the U.S.
during the 1920s. Kansas alone had 220 failures. By contrast, New England had just
14, and California 31. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943, pp.
284-85). See Alston, Grove and Wheelock (1993) for analysis of state differences in
bank failure rates during the 1920s.
11. We focus our study on this period because, as discussed below, a state supreme court
ruling in 1926 reduced the cost of withdrawal from the deposit insurance system for
Kansas banks. Most banks then withdrew, effectively ending deposit insurance even
though the system was not closed officially until 1929.
12. This requirement was waived if there were no other insured banks in an applicant’s
town. National banks, trust companies, unincorporated banks and state banks not
meeting the various requirements for membership were ineligible for deposit insurance.
— 21 —13. The minimum capital/deposit ratio was eliminated in 1917 [Warburton (1958)].
14. For example, a bank with $100,000 of deposits and $10,000 of capital would pay $45
per year, versus $42.50 if it had $15,000 of capital.
15. Surplus refers to paid-in capital beyond the par value of a bank’s stock plus undis-
tributed profits.
16. Espahdobi (1991) uses a similar model for bank failures in the 1980s.
17. The source of our data is the Bienniat Report of the Commissioner of Banking for
Kansas.
18. We dropped seven banks for missing data. Others fall out of the panel after failing,
closing voluntarily, merging with other banks, or switching to a national charter.
19. Total equity includes the par value of bank stock, paid in surplus, and undistributed
profits.
20. Only bonds issued by the Federal Government, State of Kansas, or Kansas munici-
palities were eligible for deposit with the state banking commissioner as a guarantee
of deposit insurance assessment.
21. See White (1984) or Wheelock (1992) for further development of the specific hypothe-
ses tested with each of these variables.
22. The state deposit insurance systems of the 1920s were not guaranteed by state gov-
ernments. If a fund had insufficient assets to pay depositors, it was the depositors,
not taxpayers, who lost.
23 Rather than arbitrarily dividing the effect of insurance status at 1924 as with the
INSBEF and INSAFT variables, the switching point could (in principle) be esti-
mated from the data. Unfortunately, this is difficult in the context of hazard models
with time-varying covariates. However, we redefined INSBEF and INSAFT with the
break occurring at September 1, 1922; reestimating model I yields a log-likelihood
of —134.545, which is well below the value obtained from the original specification
reported in Table 5.
24 Inspection of the correlation matrix for the ratios and the variance-covariance matrix
of the parameter estimates indicates considerable multicollinearity.
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— 26 —TABLE 1
Results of Output Technical Efficiency Estimation
Year n Mean Median Std. Dev. Maximum
1910 227 2.9141 2.4225 2.2552 22.3958
1914 252 2.5210 2.3554 1.2862 10.7056
1918 246 3.3274 2.9918 1.8823 11.3600
1020 242 3.5411 3.4257 1.7702 11.6324
1022 233 3.6434 3.3912 2.3767 14.7427
1924 213 4.8661 4.2837 3.1009 23.4874
1926 198 1.9877 1.8330 0.8461 4.5721
— 27 —TABLE 2










1914—1918 246 1 2.4982 1.7576
1918—1920 242 1 3.3187 2.7954
1920—1922 233 4 3.5675 2.8098
1922—1924 213 13 3.5390 3.9295
1924—1926 198 10 4.7566 7.1281
1926—1928 181 11 1.9879 2.1840
— 28 —TABLE 3
Slacks for Survivors and Failures
Period Y,
Survivors
Y2 Y, + Y2 Y,
Failures
Y2 Y, + Y2
1914—1918 4.58 146.28 39.41 0.0 18.72 7.62
1918—1920 117.96 23.39 64.20 0.0 310.64 83.23
1920—1922 27.40 77.90 44.51 0.0 83.43 26.96
1922—1924 4.34 195.22 71.80 0.0 523.57 138.05
1924—1926 8.57 373.04 76.36 1.38 401.01 257.52
1926—1928 2.20 44.04 15.93 0.0 99.88 29.96
NOTE: Figures represent slack in each output as a percent of output for individual bank,
averaged over all banks either surviving or failing.
— 29 —TABLE 4
Scale Efficiency for Survivors and Failures
Period SCALE
Survivors
# DRS ~/CRS # IRS
Failures
SCALE # DRS # CRS ~/IRS
1914—1918 0.2568 45 25 176 0.2964 00 1
1918—1920 0.1756 108 9 125 —0.2194 1 00
1920—1922 0.2025 18 67 148 0.2029 1 03
1922—1924 0.6616 20 11 182 0.1727 20 11
1924—1926 —0.0977 120 14 64 —0.1238 50 5
1926—1928 0.1350 53 20 108 0.0854 4 1 6
— 30 —TABLE 5
Results of Proportional Hazard Estimation
(t-ratios in parentheses)
















































































































































NOTE: Asterisk (*) denotes parameter estimates with t-ratios significant at .1 (two-sided);
double asterisk (**) denotes estimates with t-ratios significant at .05 (two-sided).
— 132.564 —134.104 —134.545
— 31 —FIGURE 1
Measuring Technical Efficiency
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